Teranode Review · security

Current controls, stated without borrowed assurance.

Teranode Review uses application, routing, integrity, and firm-scoping controls. SOC 2 Type II is planned and not yet engaged. This page distinguishes implemented controls from future work.

Application boundary

Requests are validated before model routing.

  • Strict schemas. Input, model output, public review, disposition, and attestation shapes are bounded and validated.
  • Identifier gate. The operator confirms the absence of client identifiers; detected identifiers are rejected before inference.
  • Rate and budget limits. Review and attestation endpoints reject traffic above configured request limits.
  • Timeouts and bounded retries. Provider calls cannot wait indefinitely; unavailable required lenses fail closed.
  • Response projection. The browser receives the defined review schema rather than raw provider responses or routing secrets.
Model routing

The applicable source-separation rule is enforced in code.

  • An AI-generated source must declare its model vendor, which is excluded before reviewers are selected.
  • A human-authored source must declare its originating team or role and is not assigned a model vendor.
  • The completed response is rejected if it does not follow the separation rule for the declared source type.
  • The completed response is rejected if it does not meet the required distinct-vendor floor.
  • Requests set OpenRouter's per-request ZDR and data-collection-deny controls. OpenRouter documents those controls as routing only to endpoints covered by its Zero Data Retention policy and providers that do not collect user data; handling remains governed by OpenRouter's terms.
  • Returned model identifiers are checked against the expected model maker.
Integrity

The attestation endpoint does not trust the browser copy.

The server issues an HMAC over the canonical review and verifies it before constructing a record. Dispositions must cover every finding exactly once, and the final decision must be consistent with those dispositions.

Filed records are scoped to the authenticated firm. The request path does not create or alter database schema. A conflicting second attestation is rejected rather than silently overwriting the first.

Infrastructure

Current service providers.

  • Vercel. Application hosting and request execution.
  • OpenRouter. Routing to configured model providers.
  • Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, and xAI. Model inference where selected by policy and permitted by source exclusion.
  • Neon. Firm-scoped storage for records explicitly filed through an authenticated archive session.

See Trust for the content path and Privacy for retention choices.

Assurance status

SOC 2 Type II is not yet engaged.

Teranode does not present a planned audit as completed assurance. Current diligence is based on the implemented controls, disclosed architecture, test evidence, and available vendor documentation. Contractual security terms and a DPA are discussed during an active firm review.

Vulnerability disclosure

Report a security issue directly.

Send a description and reproduction steps to security@teranode.ai. Do not include client data, credentials, or unnecessary personal data in the report.

Product behavior is described on Method. Security statements on this page describe current controls and do not constitute certification or a warranty.